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1Abstract:
This paper studies the e⁄ects that the revelation of information on the electorate￿ s
preferences has on voters￿turnout decisions. The experimental data show that closeness
in the division of preferences induces a signi￿cant increase in turnout. Moreover, for
closely divided electorates (and only for these electorates) the provision of information
signi￿cantly raises the participation of subjects supporting the slightly larger team rela-
tive to the smaller team. We show that the heterogeneous e⁄ect of information on the
participation of subjects in di⁄erent teams is driven by the subjects￿(incorrect) beliefs
of casting a pivotal vote. Simply put, subjects overestimate the probability of casting a
pivotal vote when they belong to the team with a slight majority, and choose the strat-
egy that maximizes their utility based on their in￿ ated probability assessment. Empirical
evidence on gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1990 and 2005 is consistent with
our main experimental result. Namely, we observe that the di⁄erence in the actual vote
tally between the party leading according to the polls and the other party is larger than
the one predicted by the polls only in closely divided electorates. We provide a behavioral
model that explains the main ￿ndings of our experimental and empirical analyses.
Keywords: Voter Turnout, Public Opinion Polls, Experimental Economics.
JEL Classi￿cation: C72, C92, D72, H41
21. Introduction
In large electorates the probability of casting a pivotal vote is close to zero regardless
of the actual distribution of preferences. A poll pointing to an evenly split electorate,
however, may a⁄ect the voters￿beliefs on the probability of casting a pivotal vote and,
therefore, the voters￿turnout decisions.1 Indeed, a lively debate is being carried in several
countries on whether or not polls a⁄ect electoral results. A fundamental di¢ culty when
trying to empirically assess the causal e⁄ect of public opinion polls on the individuals￿
turnout decisions is that of omitted variables. Several factors, like valence characteristics
of candidates and their chosen platforms, a⁄ect not only individuals￿turnout but also the
public opinion polls.
This paper analyses experimentally and empirically the impact that the provision of
information on the electorate￿ s distribution of preferences has on the voters￿participation
decisions.2 Our experiment compares the subjects￿participation decisions in an election
when they know the exact distribution of preferences of the electorate to their decisions
when they only know their own preferences. Our objective is to uncover any behavioral
e⁄ects that the provision of information may have on the voters. Additionally, we collected,
through a survey administered at the beginning and at the end of our experiment, the
1In the last presidential elections in the U.S., for example, individual voters that supported Ralph Nader
and resided in states where the election was predicted to be close traded their votes with John Kerry￿ s
supporters that lived in states where the election was expected to be lopsided in favor of one candidate.
People that traded votes felt that now their vote ￿really counted.￿As related in votepair.org/stories: ￿I
live in Utah. The most republican state in the nation. I happen to be a democrat who voted for Gore.
My vote did not count because of the stupid electoral college. By swapping my vote, I can ￿nally have
my vote count for a democrat.￿
2See Goeree and Gro￿ er (2005) and Taylor and Yildirim (2005) for recent theoretical studies of the
e⁄ects of information on the electorate￿ s behavior.
3subjects￿estimated probabilities of casting a pivotal vote for all the di⁄erent distributions
of preferences. This allow us to assess whether the subjects￿behavior is a consequence of
their beliefs or despite thereof.
The experimental results show that closeness in the division of preferences induces a
signi￿cant increase in turnout. Perhaps more surprisingly, in closely divided electorates
(and only for these electorates) the provision of information signi￿cantly raises the par-
ticipation of subjects supporting the slightly larger team relative to the smaller team ￿ we
refer to this behavior as the bandwagon e⁄ect of polls. This behavior contradicts the
qualitative predictions of the unique quasi-symmetric equilibrium of the theoretical model
underlying the experiments. According to the equilibrium conditions the provision of
information on the electorate￿ s preferences should induce voters in the majority to partic-
ipate less frequently because they free ride on the voting of other individuals supporting
the same alternative. At the same time polls should stimulate the participation of voters
in the minority to o⁄set the advantage of the other alternative. These requirements of
the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium seem counter-intuitive and are not supported by the
experimental data.3
To uncover the root causes behind the bandwagon e⁄ect of polls we incorporate into the
analysis the subjects￿responses to the surveys. This analysis shows that the heterogeneous
e⁄ect of information on the participation of subjects in di⁄erent teams is driven by the
subjects￿(incorrect) beliefs of casting a pivotal vote. Simply put, subjects overestimate the
3A similar behavioral departure from mixed strategies Nash equilibrium was documented by Rapaport
et al. (2002) in an experimental study of market entry with asymmetric players.
4probability of casting a pivotal vote when they belong to the team with a slight majority,
and choose the strategy that maximizes their utility based on their in￿ ated probability
assessment. This conjecture was ￿rst formalized by Riker and Ordeshook (1967). To
the best of our knowledge, the current paper is the ￿rst attempt to formally test this
hypothesis.
The observed bandwagon e⁄ect of polls is consistent with previous experimental stud-
ies. While studying the incidence of reform in the presence of individual-speci￿c uncer-
tainty, Cason and Miu (2005) ￿nd that the participation rates of the majority are higher
than the participation rates of the minority. In an independent study, Gro￿ er et al. (2005)
examine the welfare implications of endogenous voter participation using a di⁄erent exper-
imental design that includes ￿ oating voters. They also ￿nd that the majority participates
more than the minority but this di⁄erence is not statistically signi￿cant. Their experi-
mental design allows them to test this hypothesis only using the electorate as the unit of
observation. Our experiment, like Cason and Miu￿ s (2005), is especially designed to use
the subjects as our unit of observation, granting us the possibility to di⁄erentiate between
distributions with enough observations for each one to be able to perform statistically
meaningful tests.
Finally, Levine and Palfrey (2005) experimentally test the predictions of Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1985) whereby participation costs are heterogeneous and privately known.
They ￿nd that subjects in the small team vote with higher frequency than subjects in
the large team. Unlike our experimental design, theirs doesn￿ t directly test for the e⁄ects
of the provision of information. Perhaps more importantly, their study [as well as that of
5Gro￿ er et al. (2005)] reveals the exact vote tally at the end of each round thus allowing
the subjects to gain experience and learn over rounds. This was done in order to check
whether the subjects￿behavior converges with experience to the one predicted by the pure
strategy equilibrium of the game they analyzed.
This paper￿ s objective is not to examine the predictions of a particular model, but
rather to reveal the individuals￿behavioral reactions to the publication of public opinion
polls. Therefore, we use a random and anonymous reassignment procedure speci￿cally to
reduce repeated game incentives and minimize the e⁄ects of learning. We believe this is
the right experimental design given the objectives of our study.
We test the external validity of our main experimental result using a newly culled
data set on gubernatorial elections in the U.S. since 1990. For these purposes we use as
our proxy to closeness in the distribution of preferences the results of pre-election polls
published by newspapers within one week before the elections. The observed evidence
is consistent with the experimental results. Namely, in elections where the polls pointed
to a narrow margin between the two parties the di⁄erence in the elections￿vote share of
the two parties is greater than the di⁄erence predicted by the polls. The e⁄ect above is
not present in electoral contests that were expected to be lopsided according to the polls￿
predictions.
The individuals￿behavioral pattern has signi￿cant implications in two di⁄erent con-
texts. The immediate one is in the context of voting, where our results point to an in-
teresting behavioral phenomenon that has been overlooked by the related literature. This
behavior has important implications on the widespread policy debate on the desirability
6of publishing polls close to an election date. On the one hand, supporters of the ban claim
that the observed inclination of people to vote for candidates leading in the surveys may
lead to the manipulation of polls before elections by parties with vested interests. On
the other hand, opponents to the measure claim that a ban on polls before elections sup-
presses the freedom of expression.4 Experimentally, we show that the bandwagon e⁄ect is
a direct consequence of higher voter participation and not necessarily of voters changing
their preferences. This suggests that a policy geared to increase voters￿participation can
substantially o⁄set the e⁄ects of polls.
The observed phenomenon has also broader implications regarding the empirical rel-
evance of mixed strategy equilibria in more general setups. When a player can choose
between two alternatives she may use a mixed strategy only when she is indi⁄erent be-
tween the two. In an asymmetric environment as the one proposed here, players in the
small team would be indi⁄erent between voting and abstaining only if players in the large
team vote with a relatively lower frequency than players of the small team. Moreover, each
player should have the correct beliefs regarding the mixed strategies used by the rest of the
players. The equilibrium strategies (and beliefs) are not necessarily intuitive, especially
in setups with only slight di⁄erences between the players. Thus, for these conditions to
hold behaviorally probably requires that the game is played with a considerable amount
of repetition to facilitate experience and learning.
We propose an alternative theoretical explanation that relaxes Nash equilibrium but is
4According to the Foundation for Information/ESOMAR a ban on the publication of opinion polls
exists in 30 out of 66 countries surveyed in their study published in 2003. Nowadays, a lively debate is
being conducted in several countries, like Canada, France, Ireland, The Philippines and Russia.
7consistent with the voters￿beliefs and behavior observed in the laboratory. In particular,
we show that if individuals believe that in a close election the probability of voting is
su¢ ciently high and similar for every voter regardless of team sizes, then optimal behavior
with respect to these beliefs gives rise to voting patterns consistent with the ones observed
in the current study. While these beliefs cannot be part of equilibrium with groups of
unequal sizes, they are consistent with the documented departures from quasi-symmetric
equilibrium strategies in other contexts as well.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework
underlying our experiment. A detailed description of our experimental design appears in
Section 3. Section 4 shows the main experimental results of the paper. Section 5 test
the external validity of our experimental results. We present an alternative theoretical
explanation for the subjects behavior in Section 6. The last section of the paper concludes.
The proof of our theoretical result appears in the appendix.
2. Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework we consider is based on the seminal contribution of Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1983). There are n risk neutral individuals (n ￿ 3). Individuals have to
decide between two alternatives fA; Bg. The alternative is chosen via simple plurality
rule; that is, the alternative with the greater number of votes is chosen. In the event of a
tie each alternative is selected with equal probability. This is a collective choice problem:
the chosen alternative applies to all the individuals.
8Each individual has preferences over the two alternatives. Let V denote the utility
di⁄erence to an individual between the event that her favored alternative is elected and
the event that the other alternative wins the election. Each individual has to decide
whether to vote or abstain.5 Let us denote by si the strategy of individual i (let si = 1
when individual i votes and si = 0 otherwise). All the individuals make their strategy
choices simultaneously. There is a positive cost C > 0 associated with the act of voting.
V and C are common knowledge and identical to all the individuals. We assume that
V > 2C:
In this setup, a rational individual votes if and only if
V ￿ P(1;sj6=i) ￿ C ￿ V ￿ P(0;sj6=i);
where P denotes the probability that individual i￿ s preferred alternative is chosen and sj6=i
is a pro￿le that describes the strategy of all the individuals excluding individual i:
Clearly, a rational individual participates in the election only if, given the other indi-
viduals￿strategies, her participation a⁄ects the probability that her preferred alternative
is chosen. In other words, an individual may turn out to vote only when she is pivotal.
We analyze the game above under two di⁄erent frameworks regarding the individuals￿
information about the distribution of preferences. The ￿rst scenario focuses on a symmet-
ric private value model of voting. Accordingly, each voter knows the alternative that she
5In the present framework voting against one￿ s preferred alternative is strictly dominated by not voting.
Therefore, we rule out this possibility and, whenever we say that an individual votes, we imply that she
is voting in support of her preferred alternative.
9favors and that the probability that any other individual prefers any given alternative is
the same for both alternatives. The individuals￿probability distributions are stochastically
independent.
We focus on symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) as the relevant equilibrium
concept for the symmetric private value model of voting. This equilibrium concept as-
sumes that the every individual￿ s decision to participate is independent of the alternative
that she favors because of the symmetric common prior over the individuals￿distribution
of preferences; that is, all the individuals randomize between voting for their preferred
alternative and abstaining with the same probability. (A formal de￿nition appears in
Appendix A.)
In the second scenario the number of voters favoring each alternative is commonly
known. This is exactly the framework analyzed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). This
complete information game has multiple Nash equilibria. The solution concept that gen-
erates unique predictions for the game is that of totally quasi-symmetric mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium (QSNE). According to this equilibrium concept all the individuals sup-
porting the same alternative are using the same strategy. Moreover, this strategy involves
voting with a probability strictly between zero and one. Note that, unlike the BNE, in
the QSNE individuals supporting di⁄erent alternatives are not necessarily mixing with the
same probability. (See Appendix A for a formal de￿nition of this equilibrium concept.)
For the purposes of our experimental study we focus on electorates of seven individuals
and set V = 10 and C = 4: We choose an odd number of participants in each electorate
to rule out equilibrium in pure strategies (except for the case where all the participants
10share the same preferences). When the subjects know the distribution of preferences
symmetric equilibria do not exist for this con￿guration either. In fact, with seven players
and two alternatives there exists a unique totally mixed QSNE and a unique totally mixed
symmetric BNE. Table 1 provides the point predictions for the unique BNE and QSNE.
[Table 1 about here]
Note that in the QSNE for every distribution of preferences individuals in the minority
vote with higher probability than individuals in the majority. This result is a direct
consequence of the mixed strategies equilibrium￿ s requirement that individuals￿should be
indi⁄erent between voting and abstaining. Since individuals would be willing to vote only
if the probability of casting a pivotal vote is positive, they have to expect that with a
high enough probability the number of votes in support for each team would be equal, or
di⁄er by only one vote. To satisfy that requirement individuals supporting the large team
should vote with lower probability than individuals supporting the small team.
3. Experimental Design
The experiment was run at the RatioLab - The Center for Rationality and Interactive De-
cision Theory at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The 84 subjects in this experiment
were recruited from the pool of undergraduate and graduate students from The Hebrew
University and had no previous experience in experiments related to voters￿participation.
In each session 21 subjects participated as voters. The experiments were conducted
11via computers. Before the experiment started an experimental administrator read the
instructions aloud. We also asked several hypothetical questions at the end of the in-
structions to check subjects￿comprehension of the procedure (the instructions and the
questionnaire are located in Appendix B). The experiment began after all subjects had
solved all questions successfully. The experiment lasted for about ninety minutes. Each
subject received 80 tokens as a participation fee and subsequent earnings according to
the payo⁄s speci￿ed in the experiment. Average earnings were equal to 244 tokens. We
converted each token to NIS 0.25 and paid the subjects in cash in private at the end of
the session.6 Throughout the experiment we ensured anonymity and e⁄ectively isolated
each subject in a cubicle to minimize any interpersonal in￿ uence that could stimulate
uniformity of behavior. Communication among subjects was not allowed throughout the
session.
Each experimental session entailed 20 independent rounds. In each round we randomly
divided 21 subjects into three electorates of seven participants each. At the beginning of
each round an equal probability rule randomly assigned each subject to one of two teams:
Green or Blue. A subject earns 10 tokens if the team she prefers is selected by majority
voting in an election. Voting entails a cost of 4 tokens.
The sequence of events is as follows. Subjects know that the round is divided into
two stages, and that each subject will decide whether to vote or abstain in each stage.
Every subject knows that her decision in one stage is independent from her decision in
6That is, subjects on average earned NIS 61 for roughly 90 minutes of their time. The hourly minimum
wage in Israel is slightly below NIS 20. The current exchange rate is NIS 4.5 per U.S. dollar.
12the other stage. In the ￿rst stage of each round each subject knows only her preferred
color. She decides whether to vote or abstain. After all the participants make their
decisions we proceed to the second stage of the round. In this stage subjects are told the
electorate￿ s distribution of preferences. Note that subjects don￿ t receive any information
on the subjects￿participation decisions in the round￿ s ￿rst stage. Subjects have to decide
again whether or not to vote. After all the subjects choose an action, they learn the
selected teams of the ￿rst and second elections, their corresponding payo⁄s for the round,
and their cumulative payo⁄s ￿no information is provided on the number of subjects that
voted for a given team. Ties are always broken by an equal probability rule. At the
end of each round subjects are randomly reshu› ed between electorates and each subject￿ s
preferred color is again randomly decided.
In addition to playing this game each subject completed a survey that asked her to
assess the probability of casting a pivotal vote for each possible team size. Every subject
completed the same survey twice ￿ before the beginning of the ￿rst round and after
￿nishing the last round.
4. Experimental Results
This section presents the e⁄ects of revealing information about the electorate￿ s distribution
of preferences on the subjects￿turnout decisions. To clarify the exposition we divide this
section into two subsections. The ￿rst subsection presents the basic results on the impact of
information provision on subjects￿participation decisions. The second subsection reports
13the results taking into account not only subjects￿actions but also their beliefs.
For all the tests reported below the unit of observation is the subject. For the nonpara-
metric tests we consider, for each subject, the average across all the di⁄erent rounds. This
eliminates possible correlations across repeated observations of a given subject. Therefore,
the statistics reported are averages of the subjects￿averages. In the regression analysis,
however, we use all the available data, adopting a random e⁄ects speci￿cation with the
subject as the random factor.
4.1. The E⁄ect of Information on Subjects￿Turnout Decisions
Figure 1 depicts the average turnout rate before the provision of information and the
average turnout rate after information is revealed, as a function of the di⁄erent distribution
of preferences. The ￿gure also includes the equilibrium￿ s predicted turnout rate.
[Figure 1 about here]
The ￿gure clearly indicates that closeness in the division of preferences induces a
signi￿cant increase in turnout. Whereas the average turnout rate before the provision of
information is slightly below 25 percent, the average turnout rate for a distribution of
teams of sizes three and four is 40 percent (the di⁄erence between the two is statistically
signi￿cant with z = 3:125; p < 0:001; two-sided sign test using the normal approximation
to the binomial distribution).
The provision of information for other divisions of the electorates doesn￿ t have a signif-
14icant impact on the subjects￿turnout relative to their turnout rates before the provision
of information (p > 0:8 when the division of teams is ￿ve versus two; p > 0:65 when the
division is six versus one; and p > 0:8 when the division is seven versus zero, all according
to a two-sided sign test). Moreover, the observed rates aren￿ t substantially di⁄erent from
the equilibrium￿ s prediction. The turnout rate is higher than the equilibrium￿ s predic-
tion for distributions of seven versus zero and ￿ve versus two, whereas turnout is lower
than the equilibrium￿ s prediction for a distribution of six versus one. For closely divided
preferences, on the contrary, we observe important quantitative di⁄erences between the
subjects￿turnout and the predictions of the theoretical model underlying the experiment.7
Although Figure 1 reveals a clear and signi￿cant e⁄ect of closeness on participation, the
￿gure masks important and unexpected di⁄erences between teams for a given distribution
of preferences. The heterogeneous e⁄ect of closeness between teams is presented in Figure
2, which decomposes turnout as a function of the size of the teams. Note that a team of
size j implies that the distribution of the electorate￿ s preferences is (j;7 ￿ j):
This ￿gure shows the most startling e⁄ect that emerges from our experiment: For
closely divided electorates the e⁄ect of information on voter participation is not homoge-
nous across teams of di⁄erent sizes. In particular, the provision of information signi￿cantly
raises the participation of voters supporting the slightly larger team relative to the par-
ticipation of voters supporting the smaller team, thus a⁄ecting the election￿ s results.
7The correlation between closeness and turnout observed in the laboratory is consistent with results in
the related empirical literature [see, for example, Shachar and Nalebu⁄ (1999)]. Feddersen and Sandroni
(2006) show that this correlation can be explained using a model where voters have ethical preferences.
Coate and Conlin (2004) provide empirical evidence supporting the ethical voters approach.
15[Figure 2 about here]
In other words, for closely divided electorates revealing information on subjects￿pref-
erences causes an important increase on the participation of all the subjects: Subjects
that belong to teams of size three and four vote more often after learning the distribution
of preferences. The e⁄ect, however, is stronger for subjects that belong to the slightly
larger team. The turnout rate for subjects that belong to a team with four supporters
is more than twenty percent higher than the turnout rate of subjects that belong to a
team of three. This behavior contradicts the quantitative and qualitative predictions of
the theoretical model. Accordingly, members of the minority should vote with a higher
probability than the members of the majority to o⁄set the advantage of the majority.
Moreover, the provision of information should induce a decrease in the turnout rate of the
majority because of free riding of its members.
We don￿ t observe a similar e⁄ect for electorates with a more lopsided division of prefer-
ences. For electorates that aren￿ t closely divided, revealing the distribution of preferences
doesn￿ t a⁄ect the turnout rate of subjects supporting the small team but lowers the turnout
of subjects supporting the large team. For example, we see an important decrease in the
participation of subjects after learning that they belong to a team of size seven. A similar
phenomenon occurs for subjects that belong to a team of six subjects. Note that these
subjects turn out in a frequency lower than the frequency of a subject that is the sole
supporter of an alternative. An analogous situation occurs when the subjects￿preferences
16are divided between teams of ￿ve and two members. This behavior, which seems to be a
consequence of free riding, is in accordance with the equilibrium￿ s predictions.
The di⁄erent e⁄ect of closeness on subjects conditional on the size of the team they
support is evident from the estimation of the following participation equation:
V ote_Infi;t = 1f￿0 + ￿1V ote_NoInfi;t + ￿2Majorityi;t + ￿3roundt + ￿i = 0g (4.1)
where 1f￿g is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the left hand side of the
inequality inside the brackets is greater than or equal to zero, and 0 otherwise; V ote_Infi;t
re￿ ects subject i￿ s participation decision in the second stage of round t after the provision of
information on the distribution of preferences. The covariates account for the subject￿ s de-
cision in the ￿rst stage of round t before the provision of information (V ote_NoInfi;t), and
whether or not the subject belongs to the large team in an electoral contest (Majorityi;t).
We also include in the analysis a time trend (roundt) to capture the fact that subjects may
systematically change their strategy as a consequence of learning from round to round;
and a subject speci￿c constant e⁄ect (￿i) that captures random disturbances (constant
through time) that characterize subject i:
We estimate equation (4.1) separately for each di⁄erent distribution of subjects￿prefer-
ences using a random e⁄ects probit estimation.8 Table 2 presents the estimated coe¢ cients.
8A similar estimation strategy was used in an experimental context by Frechette et al. (2005). That
study￿ s main focus is the analysis of the impact of open versus closed amendment rules in models of
bargaining.
17[Table 2 about here]
The table quanti￿es the most striking of our results: When the electorate is closely
divided, the provision of information on subjects￿preferences signi￿cantly raises the par-
ticipation of subjects in the majority relative to the minority. The team size e⁄ect when
the electorate is divided into teams of three versus four subjects is positive, large in value
relative to the other coe¢ cients and statistically signi￿cant. It increases the probability
of voting by slightly over 10 percent for the average subject. We also observe a signi￿cant
negative e⁄ect of rounds, pointing to a learning process that induces subjects to reduce
their participation in elections.9 Interestingly, subjects￿participation decision in the ￿rst
stage of each round doesn￿ t explain their actions after the provision of information.
The subjects￿behavior is qualitatively di⁄erent when the di⁄erence in the number of
supporters for each team is relatively large. When the di⁄erence in the number of support-
ers is of three or ￿ve subjects the provision of information doesn￿ t a⁄ect the participation
of subjects in the majority any di⁄erently than it a⁄ects the participation of subjects in
the minority. For these groups compositions, moreover, the number of rounds elapsed
doesn￿ t a⁄ect participation.
Contrary to closely divided groups, when the di⁄erence in the number of supporters
for each team is relatively large the best predictor for subjects￿participation decisions
9We test the same model including the interaction between majority and number of rounds as an
additional covariate. The coe¢ cient for this covariate is not signi￿cant; thus, the signi￿cant di⁄erences
between majority and minority don￿ t disappear over rounds.
18after the provision of information is the subjects￿actions in the ￿rst stage of each round.
That is, there are subjects that reveal a preference for participation in the ￿rst stage, and
therefore these subjects are the ones turning out to vote in the second stage when the
electorate￿ s preferences are not closely divided. This seems to be particularly the case in
very lopsided contests (6 versus 1) where the coe¢ cient of the ￿rst stage decision is not
only highly statistically signi￿cant, but also large in value relative to the other coe¢ cients.
The probability of voting in the second stage is 30 percent higher for the average subject
that belongs to a team of size one and voted in the ￿rst stage relative to the average
subject that didn￿ t vote in the ￿rst stage. The marginal e⁄ect of voting in the ￿rst stage
on the probability of voting in the second stage is 24 percent for subjects in teams of size
6.
The fact that the provision of information signi￿cantly raises the participation of sub-
jects in the majority relative to the minority in closely divided electorates not only contra-
dicts the intuitions behind the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium concept but also those
of the alternative quantal response equilibrium concept. Interestingly, however, the quan-
tal response equilibrium predicts that the observed participation rate should be higher
(lower) than that predicted by the Nash equilibrium when the participation rate predicted
by the Nash equilibrium is below (above) 0.5 (Goeree and Holt, 2005). This prediction
is borne out by the data both before and after the provision of information. Moreover,
this prediction ￿nds additional support in the next section where we analyze the subjects￿
beliefs.
194.2. The E⁄ect of Subjects￿Beliefs on Their Turnout Decisions
This subsection incorporates into the analysis the surveys￿answers to better account for
the subjects￿strategies. As already pointed out, these surveys, conducted at the beginning
and at the end of the experiment, asked every subject to quantify the probability of casting
a pivotal vote for every possible distribution of preferences. Theoretically, the equilibrium
probability of casting a pivotal vote depends only on 2C=V ￿ the voting cost divided by
half the bene￿ts of a victory of the subject￿ s preferred alternative. Given that we hold
both constant, the equilibrium￿ s predicted probability of casting a pivotal vote is constant
as well regardless of the distribution of preferences. (In our application with a bene￿t of
10 tokens and a cost of 4 tokens this probability is equal to 0.8).
Figure 3 depicts the average subjects￿beliefs of casting a pivotal vote as a function of
the size of the team. The ￿gure includes the results of the survey taken at the beginning
(labeled survey 1 in the ￿gure) and at the end of the experiment (survey 2). This ￿gure
also includes the frequencies of elections in which at least one subject was pivotal based
on the other subjects actual behavior.
[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 shows that subjects grossly miscalculate the probability of casting a pivotal
vote. Quantitatively, the subjects state a probability much lower than the theoretical
and actual probabilities. Qualitatively, subjects￿beliefs seem to be strongly a⁄ected by
the distribution of preferences across teams. A low probability is attributed to situations
20with a large di⁄erence in the number of supporters between the two teams, whereas the
probability shows an important increase for closely divided teams. On average, the subjects
stated a probability of 36.14% (with a standard deviation of 21.41%) of casting a pivotal
vote when the di⁄erence between the teams is one. The stated probability decreases to
25.54% and 20.48% as the di⁄erences in team sizes increases to three and ￿ve respectively
(the corresponding standard deviations are 17.53% and 18.01%). For teams of size seven
the reported probability is 23.04% (the standard deviation is 27.08%). The subjects￿
estimates for a close distribution of preferences is signi￿cantly di⁄erent than their estimates
for the rest of the distributions (p < 0:001).10
It follows from the previous subsection (see Figure 2) that not only subjects￿beliefs of
casting a pivotal vote are relatively higher for closely divided electorates, but also their
propensity to vote increases for these electorates. As a consequence, the actual probability
of casting a pivotal vote decreases in closely divided electorates. Hence, an increase in the
subjects￿beliefs of casting a pivotal vote brings about a decrease in the actual probability
of being pivotal.
For a given distribution of preferences subjects, for the most part, attach a higher
probability of casting a pivotal vote when they belong to the majority relative to the
probability attached when subjects belong to the minority.11 Contrary to our results
from the previous section the di⁄erences are statistically signi￿cant for every distribution
10The probability stated for distributions with a division of two versus ￿ve is signi￿cantly di⁄erent
than that reported for distributions of one versus six (p < 0:001). Neither series, however, is signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from the probabilities reported for teams of size seven (p = 0:28 and 0:18; respectively).
11In the only exception, subjects in the second survey assigned a higher probability of casting a pivotal
vote to a team of size one (25.02%) than to a team of size six (21.48%).
21of preferences. The p-value that subjects in the majority state a higher probability of
casting a pivotal vote than subjects in the minority is below 0.04 for a distribution of four
versus three subjects. This value decreases to 0.03 and to 0.003 as the di⁄erence between
the teams increases to three and ￿ve, respectively.12
A comparison of the subjects￿beliefs and their participation decisions leads us to con-
jecture that the subjects￿behavior is at least partially accounted by their beliefs. Simply
put, subjects may overestimate the likelihood of casting a pivotal vote and act rationally
based on their in￿ ated probability assessment. To test this hypothesis we estimate equa-
tion (4.1) replacing Majorityi;t, the explanatory variable that captured the relative e⁄ect
of belonging to the majority, by each subject￿ s beliefs of casting a pivotal vote conditional
on the size of the subject￿ s team.
The estimated coe¢ cients appear on Column (2) of Table 2. The results are qual-
itatively similar to the ones observed in Column (1); that is, subjects￿beliefs explain
their behavior only when the distribution of preferences is closely divided between the two
teams. Intuitively, in close elections subjects believe that there is a higher probability of
casting a pivotal vote when they belong to the majority; these beliefs lead subjects to
increase their relative frequency of voting when they indeed belong to the large group.
Quantitatively, however, the coe¢ cient for the subjects￿beliefs is smaller than the co-
e¢ cient estimated in Column (1). In particular, a ten percentage point increase in the
belief of casting a pivotal vote when belonging to a team of size four causes a ￿ve percent
12All the conclusions above are reached using each subject￿ s average of both surveys for a given team
size. Interestingly, the subjects￿responses to the surveys are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent for any team size.
Our results don￿ t change if we use either survey instead of the subjects￿average of the two surveys.
22increase in the probability of voting of the average subject.
When the sizes of the teams aren￿ t closely divided the subjects￿beliefs don￿ t play
a signi￿cant role in their participation decision. In these situations, as was concluded
before, the best predictor for a subject￿ s participation in the second stage of a round is
the subject￿ s action in the ￿rst stage of the round.
The next section tests the external validity of our main experimental observation using
data from gubernatorial elections in the U.S.
5. Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections in the US
This section￿ s exercise is mainly intended to assess the external validity of our main ex-
perimental result. Using a newly culled data set on gubernatorial elections in the U.S. we
test whether, in close elections, the di⁄erence in the actual vote tally between the party
slightly leading according to the polls and the other party is larger than the one predicted
by the polls. This hypothesis emanates directly from our experimental results and, to the
best of our knowledge, has never been addressed in the vast extant empirical literature on
voter turnout.
For the purposes of our empirical exercise we use as our proxy for closeness in the
distribution of preferences the results of pre-election polls on gubernatorial races in the
U.S., between 1990 and 2005. These polls, conducted by an independent polling ￿rm
(Mason-Dixon Polling and Research, Inc.), were published by newspaper media within
23one week before the elections.13 The polls are supposed to be extremely accurate. They
are published right before the elections and report results based only on likely voters.
Therefore, the polls already incorporate other factors that a⁄ect participation (e.g. candi-
dates￿spending and mobilizations￿e⁄ects). Hence, any systematic di⁄erence between the
polls and the electoral results may be attributed, at least partially, to e⁄ects that the poll
has on the electorate ￿e⁄ects that were not taken into account by the polling company.
Our data set consists of 143 gubernatorial elections in 47 states. These are all the
elections between 1990 and 2005 where Mason-Dixon Polling and Research, Inc. conducted
a public opinion poll within one week before the elections and where a third party didn￿ t
receive more than 30 percent of the election￿ s votes.
The main two variables of interest are the di⁄erences in the vote share for the leading
party minus the vote share for the trailing party according to the polls, and the electoral
results. Let us denote by
DP = Lp ￿ Tp
the di⁄erence in the vote share of the leading and trailing parties according to the polls,
and denote by
DE = Le ￿ Te
the corresponding di⁄erence between the two parties according to the electoral results.14
13According to Matsusaka and Palda (1993, p. 861) ￿the ideal measure would be survey predictions
from opinion polls taken the day before the election.￿Our data come as close as possible to that ideal.
14For a given election the classi￿cation of the parties as leading or trailing is ￿xed. Therefore, DP
is always positive whereas DE may be negative if the winner of the election is the party trailing in the
published public opinion poll. This occurs for 11 observations in our sample.
24Our exercise focuses on deviations of the electoral results from the polls predictions, DE￿
DP; and how these deviations correlate with the size of DP:
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the variables of interest. The table di⁄erentiates
between elections where the di⁄erence in the support between the two parties according
to the polls was less than 10 percentage points and the rest of the elections.15
[Table 3 about here]
The table clearly illustrates the main di⁄erence between closely divided electorates and
the rest. The mean di⁄erence between DE and DP is positive for elections expected to be
close and negative for the rest of the elections. Moreover, the mean deviation between the
electoral results and the polls￿predictions is higher, in absolute value, for closely divided
electorates than for the rest of the electorates (0.0154 and -0.0071 percentage points,
respectively) even though the latter group of elections has a higher variance.
Figure 4 depicts DE ￿ DP on the vertical axis and DP on the horizontal axis. The
￿gure includes the resulting curve according to the predicted value of DE ￿DP based on
the estimation of a fractional polynomial of DP; along with the con￿dence interval of the
mean (calculated using robust standard errors).
[Figure 4 about here]
15The chosen cuto⁄ of 10 percent is the level of closeness that emerges endogenously from the analysis
below.
25The observed pattern in Figure 4 is consistent with our experimental results. Ac-
cordingly, for polls pointing to a narrow margin between the candidates we observe a
bandwagon e⁄ect, whereby supporters of the leading candidate increase their participa-
tion relative to supporters of the trailing candidate.16 This is the case for polls predicting
a di⁄erence smaller than 22 percentage points between the two parties. The bandwagon
e⁄ect is particularly strong for DP values between 4 and 10 percentage points. In this
range DE ￿ DP is statistically greater than zero at the 2.5% signi￿cance level.17
In electoral contests that are expected to be one-sided the above e⁄ect isn￿ t present.
For these contests the predicted value of DE ￿ DP is decreasing as the di⁄erence in the
support for the two parties according to the polls increases. As predicted by the theoretical
models, free riding of supporters of the large party seems to be behind the negative slope
of DE ￿ DP in lopsided divided electorates.
Summing up, the evidence presented above is consistent with our experimental results.
We need to stress that the empirical analysis is correlational in nature ￿ it can￿ t by
itself establish causality. Combined with our experimental results, however, the empirical
evidence strengthens the case for the existence of a bandwagon e⁄ect of public opinion
polls in closely divided electorates.
16One may think that the publication of the poll may not only a⁄ect the voters￿participation decision
but their preferences as well. Since we restrict our attention to polls published within one week of the
actual elections we believe that this e⁄ect isn￿ t of an important magnitude.
17If we restrict the estimation to be linear DE ￿ DP is statistically greater than zero at the 2.5%
signi￿cance level for every DP value lower than 0.1.
266. A Behavioral Model
Our main experimental results, con￿rmed using data on gubernatorial elections, cannot
be accounted by the traditional rational choice approach to turnout. The results therefore
call for an alternative behavioral explanation.
An alternative speci￿cation of the voters￿utility function may help explain part of
the behavior observed in the laboratory. According to the traditional approach each
voter￿ s bene￿t and cost of participation aren￿ t a⁄ected by whether the voter is in the
losing or winning side of the contest. Several papers, mainly interested in models of
sequential voting, modify the voters￿utility function to take into account the fact that
voters experience a desire to vote for the winner (on top of the costs and bene￿ts explicit
in rational choice models).18 This approach, while able to explain bandwagons, assumes
that the very behavior we need to explain is good for the voters. Moreover, the approach
doesn￿ t account for the stark di⁄erence observed in the voters￿behavior between elections
expected to be close and the rest of the elections.
In this section we propose an alternative approach that relaxes Nash equilibrium but is
consistent with the voters￿beliefs and behavior observed in the laboratory. The Nash equi-
librium concept requires that players optimize with respect to beliefs which are consistent
with the actual strategies of players. As we have already pointed out no such combina-
tion can support the behavior we observe in our ￿ndings. Our experimental results may
18Borgers (2004) mentions this possibility in a simultaneous voting game similar to the one we analyze
here. Callander (2004) models this possibility explicitly in a sequential voting game by adding a positive
parameter to a voter￿ s utility function when the voter supports the winning alternative. See Morton and
Williams (1999) and Battaglini et al. (2005) for experimental studies of sequential voting games.
27be consistent with a weaker notion of rationality. Are there ￿reasonable￿beliefs that we
can attribute to voters under which voters￿best responses will be akin to the observed
behavior (without these beliefs being consistent with the actual voters￿strategies)?
Herein we present a set of reasonable beliefs which will satisfy these conditions: If voters
believe that in a close election the probability of voting is similar for all the individuals
and those probabilities are su¢ ciently high, then optimal behavior with respect to these
beliefs gives rise to voting patterns consistent with the ones documented in the previous
sections. Formally,
Proposition 1: Suppose individuals believe that voters in the majority vote with prob-
ability q and voters in the minority vote with probability r; with jq ￿ rj < "; for some
su¢ ciently small " > 0: If r ￿ 1=2 the probability of casting a pivotal vote is higher for a
voter in the majority than for a voter in the minority.
To illustrate the intuition behind the proposition let us consider the case of a closely
divided electorate when individuals believe that r is close to one. In this case, an individual
that supports the large team believes it is very likely that her vote may break a tie. On the
contrary, an individual that supports the small team believes that her team will loose the
election regardless of her choice. Thus, under the conditions of Proposition 1 individuals
believe that there is a higher probability of casting a pivotal vote when they support the
large team. This result is consistent with the beliefs stated by the subjects in their answers
to the surveys.19
19The subjects￿beliefs are similar to a "level-1" individual best responding to "level-0" individuals in
the theoretical framework developed by Crawford and Iriberri (2005).
28The main condition behind Proposition 1 is the individuals￿beliefs that all voters
mix with similar probabilities. Although these beliefs cannot be part of equilibrium with
groups of unequal sizes, they seem reasonable when the preferences of the electorate are
almost equally split between the two alternatives. This may explain why the bandwagon
e⁄ect of polls occurs only when the electorate is closely divided.
7. Conclusions
This paper studies the e⁄ect that information on the voters￿distribution of preferences
has on turnout. The main ￿nding is that the observed increase in turnout when the
distribution of preferences is closely divided is heterogenous across teams of di⁄erent sizes.
In particular, the increase in turnout is signi￿cantly larger for the alternative with a
slight majority according to the poll. That is, polls have a bandwagon e⁄ect whereby the
frontrunner alternative increases its relative support in the elections. This e⁄ect, observed
only in close elections, is not a consequence of voters changing their preferences. Rather,
it is entirely driven by individuals that already supported the leading team voting with a
relatively higher frequency.
We showed that the bandwagon e⁄ect of polls in closely divided electorates is a direct
consequence of the subjects￿beliefs. That is, for closely divided electorates we observe
that subjects overestimate the probability of casting a pivotal vote and behave according
to those beliefs. On the contrary, subjects￿beliefs don￿ t explain their actions in electorates
that are lopsided divided. Rather, only subjects that voted with high frequencies regardless
29of their beliefs or the distribution of preferences are the ones that participate in lopsided
elections. This paper documented the bandwagon e⁄ect not only in the laboratory but
also using data from U.S. gubernatorial elections in the last ￿fteen years.
It is noteworthy that the bandwagon e⁄ect cannot be accounted by the intuitions de-
rived from theoretical models on the e⁄ect of public opinion polls on turnout. This theory
is based on rational individuals holding the correct beliefs for every distribution of prefer-
ences. Hereby we proposed an alternative explanation consistent with the voters￿beliefs
and behavior observed in the laboratory. In particular, we presented a set of reasonable be-
liefs that can be attributed to voters under which utility maximization yields a behavioral
pattern consistent with the bandwagon e⁄ect of polls in closely divided electorates.
Summing up, this paper discovered an anomalous behavioral pattern in the laboratory;
it corroborated the external validity of this behavior for large electorates; and it presented
an alternative rationale for the prevalence of bandwagon e⁄ects in close elections. Clearly,
much work remains to be done for us to be able to understand what causes this e⁄ect.
Currently, we are exploring the prevalence of this e⁄ect in general environments. It seems
that subjects don￿ t fully take into account information on an ex-post asymmetric distri-
bution in environments that are ex-ante symmetric. This conjecture, if validated in the
laboratory, has implications far beyond the context of voters￿turnout.
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33Appendix A
De￿nition of Totally Mixed Strategies Symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilib-
rium: Let us denote by nA the number of voters that prefer alternative A and nB the
number of voters that prefer alternative B, with nA + nB = n: A totally mixed strategies
symmetric BNE in this context corresponds to a probability of voting ￿ that satis￿es the
following two conditions:
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denotes the probability that a voter that supports alternative A is pivotal when the rest
of the voters vote with probability ￿: Similarly,
￿(￿j B) =
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denotes the probability that a voter that supports alternative B is pivotal when the rest
of the voters vote with probability ￿: Thus, conditions (A.1) and (A.2) state that a voting
34probability ￿ is a totally mixed symmetric BNE if and only if every individual is indi⁄erent
between voting and abstaining.
De￿nition of Totally Quasi-Symmetric Mixed Strategies Nash Equilibrium:
As de￿ned by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, pp. 27), a pair of voting strategies (￿A;￿B) is
a totally quasi-symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if
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where the right hand side of (A.3) is simply the probability that a voter supporting
alternative A is pivotal when the rest of the voters supporting A vote with probability ￿A
and all the voters supporting B vote with probability ￿B. Similarly, the right hand side
of (A.4) is the probability that a voter supporting alternative B is pivotal when all the
voters supporting A vote with probability ￿A and the rest of the voters supporting B vote
with probability ￿B. Therefore, (A.3) states a su¢ cient and necessary condition for ￿A to
be a best response to ￿B and (A.4) states a su¢ cient and necessary condition for ￿B to
35be a best response to ￿A.
Proof of Proposition 1: Let us assume that there are n voters, with n > 3 and odd.
Let us say that nA of the voters prefer alternative A and nB of them prefer alternative
B; with nA + nB = n and nA < nB: Assume ￿rst that r = q: The probability that an
individual that prefers alternative A is pivotal equals
nA￿1 X
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i
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where the ￿rst term is the probability of observing a tie and the second term is the
probability that alternative A loses the election by one vote. Similarly, the probability
that an individual that prefers alternative B is pivotal equals
nA X
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Therefore, rearranging terms we can express the probability that an individual supporting
B will break a tie minus the probability that an individual supporting A will break a tie
as
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36Similarly, subtracting from the second term of (A.5) the second term of (A.6) we obtain
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Thus, the probability of casting a pivotal vote is greater when an individual supports the
majority group B if and only if (A.7) is greater than (A.8); this is equivalent to
nA￿1 X
i=0
￿
nB ￿ 1
i + 1
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nA ￿ 1
i
￿
(nB ￿ nA)
(nB ￿ 1 ￿ i)
q
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n￿1￿2(i+1) [q ￿ (1 ￿ q)] > 0:
This inequality is satis￿ed if, and only if, q > 1=2: The more general result for r 6= q
with jq ￿ rj < "; for some " > 0 follows immediately from the fact that the probability of
casting a pivotal vote is continuous on q and r. ￿
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APPENDIX B 
Experiment in Decision-Making 
This is an experiment in decision-making. During the experiment, you will make decisions and 
the other participants will do so as well. Your decisions and the others’ will determine the 
payment that you will receive according to rules that we will explain later on. 
You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment, exactly as the rules say. 
Twenty-one people are participating in the experiment. The experiment will be conducted by 
means of computers. All decisions that you make during the experiment will be implemented by 
keying appropriate commands. 
Please remain totally silent during the experiment and do not speak with the other 
participants. If you have a question of any kind, raise your hand and one of the supervisors 
will come over to you. 
 
 
The experiment is composed of several rounds. Each round has two phases—Phase 1 and 
Phase 2. 
At the beginning of the experiment, the twenty-one participants will be divided up randomly, 
by the computer, into three groups of seven participants apiece. You will not know whom among 
the other participants in the room belongs to your group. Each group plays among its own 
members only and is independent of the other groups in the room. 
At the beginning of the experiment, each participant receives a participation fee of 80 
tokens. 
At the beginning of each round, each participant receives a message from the computer 
about whether the participant prefers the choice of the blue color or of the green color. The 
computer performs a separate draw for each participant as to his or her preference of the color to 
be chosen. Each color, green or blue, has a 50 percent probability of being chosen.  
After the computer tells you which color you prefer—blue or green—you will be asked to 
make decisions: 
a.  In Phase 1 of the game, you will have to decide whether to vote for the color that you 
prefer. For your decision to vote for the color that you prefer, you will pay four tokens. 
In Phase 1 of the game, you will be given no information about the color preferences of 
the other members of your group. After you make a decision, the computer will 
immediately move on to Phase 2 of the game. 
b.  In Phase 2 of the game, you will receive information about the color 
preferences of the members of your group. For example, you will be told that 
two players in your group prefer to see the blue color chosen and that five 
members of your group prefer to see green chosen. Then you will be asked to 
decide whether to vote for the color that you prefer. For your decision to vote 
for the color that you prefer, you will pay four tokens. 
At the end of Phase 2 of the game, the computer will collect the seven decisions of the 
members of your group and determine which color was chosen in Phase 1 of the game and which 
color was chosen in Phase 2 of the game. The color chosen is the one for which a majority of the 
group members votes. 
If the color that you preferred was chosen in Phase 1, you will receive ten tokens, and the 
other members of the group who preferred this color will also receive ten tokens—whether they 
voted for it or not.   2
If the color that you preferred was chosen in Phase 2, you will receive ten tokens, and the 
other members of the group who preferred this color will also receive ten tokens—whether they 
voted for it or not. 
Note: 
The fact that many members of the group prefer a certain color does not mean that this color will 
be chosen. For a color to be chosen, it must receive an actual majority of votes. 
If all seven members of the group decide not to vote for the colors that they prefer, the 
computer will select at random the color of choice in the respective phase of the game. 
The computer will do the same in the case of a tie vote among group members between 
green and blue. Each color, green or blue, has a 50 percent probability of being chosen. 
After each round, each participant will receive feedback about: 
*  the color chosen in Phase 1 of the round and the color chosen in Phase 2 of the roujnd. 
*  the number of tokens available to you at the beginning of the round. 
*  the number of tokens that you paid out during the round (in return for the choice of voting 
for the color that you prefer in Phase 1 of the round and in Phase 2 of the round). 
*  the number of tokens that you earned during the round (by having your color of 
preference chosen in Phase 1 of the round and Phase 2 of the round). 
*  the number of tokens that you have accumulated thus far. The tokens that you 
accumulate by the end of the round will be available to you at the beginning of the next 
round. 
After you receive the feedback, the next round begins. It, too, is composed of two phases, 
and in each phase you will be asked to decide whether you wish to vote for the color that you 
prefer. 
Note: at the beginning of the next round, the groups will be recomposed. The computer 
will again divide the twenty-one participants in the room, at random, into three different groups 
of seven participants apiece. Again the computer will give you a message about the color that 
you prefer in the new round. 
 
At the end of the experiment, the computer will add up the total tokens that you 
accumulated in all the rounds in the experiment. You will be paid in cash at the exchange 
rate of four tokens = NIS 1. 
   3
Examples: please fill in your answers in the appropriate boxes. If you have questions, raise 
your hand and the supervisor will come over to you. 
 
Participant and 
his/her color 
preference 
1–prefers 
green 
2–prefers 
blue 
3–prefers 
blue 
4–prefers 
green 
5–prefers 
blue 
6–prefers 
green 
7–prefers 
blue 
Initial grant of 
tokens at beginning 
of experiment 
80  80  80 80 80 80 80 
Round 1 
 
Phase 1:  
decision-making 
without 
information about 
other group 
members’ 
preferences  
 
 
 
Decided 
to vote for 
preferred 
color 
 
 
 
Decided to 
vote for 
preferred 
color 
 
 
 
Decided 
not to 
vote for 
preferred 
color 
 
 
 
Decided to 
vote for 
preferred 
color 
 
 
 
Decided 
not to 
vote for 
preferred 
color 
 
 
 
Decided 
not to 
vote for 
preferred 
color 
 
 
 
Decided 
not to 
vote for 
preferred 
color 
Which color 
received a majority 
of group members’ 
votes in Phase 1? 
Number of votes in favor of green: ________ 
 
Number of votes in favor of blue: ________ 
Round 1 
 
Phase 2:  
decision-making 
with information 
about other group 
members’ 
preferences  
 
 
 
Decided 
not to 
vote for 
preferred 
color 
 
 
 
Decided to 
vote for 
preferred 
color 
 
 
 
Decided to 
vote for 
preferred 
color 
 
 
 
Decided to 
vote for 
preferred 
color 
 
 
 
Decided 
not to 
vote for 
preferred 
color 
 
 
 
Decided 
not to 
vote for 
preferred 
color 
 
 
 
Decided to 
vote for 
preferred 
color 
Which color 
received a majority 
of group members’ 
votes in Phase 2? 
Number of votes in favor of green: ________ 
 
Number of votes in favor of blue: ________ 
Total tokens paid 
by participant in 
both phases of the 
game for having 
chosen to vote for 
the color that 
he/she prefers 
         
Number of tokens 
earned by 
participant in this 
game for having 
chosen the color 
that he/she prefers 
         
Total tokens 
accumulated by 
participant thus far 
         
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1: Average Turnout Rate by Distribution of Preferences 
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Figure 2: Average Turnout Rate by Team Size 
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Figure 3: Subjects' Beliefs of Casting a Pivotal Vote by Team Size 
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Figure 4: Deviation of Electoral Results (DE) from Polls Predictions (DP) for 
Gubernatorial Elections, 1990 – 2005. 
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Table 1: Theoretical Predictions for the Two Different Frameworks with Benefits of Winning Equal to 10 and Costs of 
Voting Equal to 4.  
 
 
 
Distribution of Preferences 
 
3 vs. 4 
 
2 vs. 5 
 
1 vs. 6 
 
0 vs. 7 
 
 
Probability that a supporter of the large team 
votes according to the unique QSNE 
 
 
0.0873 
 
 
0.070805 
 
0.13988 
 
 
0.036508 
 
Probability that a supporter of the small team 
votes according to the unique QSNE 
 
 
0.1229 
 
 
0.24001 
 
 
0.86012 
 
 
 
Probability of voting according to the unique 
BNE 
 
0.0807 
  
Table 2: Random Effect Probit Estimates of Voting Decisions in the Second Stage (Standard errors in Parentheses). 
 
   (1)    (2)  
Distribution of Preferences  3 vs. 4  2 vs. 5  1 vs. 6  3 vs. 4  2 vs. 5  1 vs. 6 
 
Constant 
 
-0.522
*** 
(0.170) 
 
-1.039
*** 
(0.243) 
 
-1.030
*** 
(0.407) 
 
-0.740
*** 
(0.200) 
 
-0.977
*** 
(0.240) 
 
-1.446
*** 
(0.359) 
First Stage Voting Decision  0.207 
(0.143) 
0.342
* 
(0.213) 
0.921
*** 
(0.324) 
0.232 
(0.145) 
0.360
* 
(0.212) 
0.954
*** 
(0.335) 
Round -0.020
*** 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.015) 
-0.002 
(0.022) 
-0.020
*** 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.014) 
-0.004 
(0.023) 
Majority 0.305
*** 
(0.108) 
0.175 
(0.184) 
-0.339 
(0.332) 
   
Pivotal Beliefs        0.012
*** 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
Observations  854 378 203 854 378 203 
Number  of  Subjects  84 84 72 84 84 72 
  
***, 
**, 
* Indicates Statistical Significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
 
 
Table 3: Average Difference in Vote Share between Leading and Trailing Party according to Polls and Elections, 1990 – 2005 
   (Standard errors in Parentheses) 
 
 
 
(1) 
Elections Expected to be Close  
(DP  < 0.10) 
 
(2) 
Elections Not Expected to be Close  
 (DP ≥ 0.10) 
 
Difference in Vote Share between 
Leading and Trailing Party 
according to Polls (DP) 
0.0491 
(0.0258) 
0.2663 
(0.1147) 
Difference in Vote Share between 
Leading and Trailing Party 
according to Elections (DE) 
0.0645 
(0.0714) 
0.2592 
(0.1235) 
Number of Observations  78  65 
Sources: Polls' data obtained from Mason-Dixon Polling and Research, Inc.  
 